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Abstract 
This article builds upon previous literature by providing a better understanding of how 
contagion changes in bordering sovereign CDS emerging markets resulting from credit 
rating events. To that end, we follow the novel GVAR methodology using data from six 
Latin American emerging countries during an extensive sample period from 2004 
to 2014. Our findings show evidence for the existence of significant and asymmetric 
cross-border effects. In particular, a competition effect is observed before the event 
occurs, indicating that non-event countries suffer (benefit) from upgrades (downgrades) 
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1. Introduction  
 
One of the most significant financial events of the past decade has been the rapid growth 
experienced by the OTC credit derivatives market. Since 2008, credit default swaps 
(hereafter, CDSs)1 are the most widely traded credit derivative instrument used to 
efficiently transfer credit risk, offering opportunities for business diversification and the 
effective hedging of counterparty risk. According to the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), the notional outstanding value of the CDS market 
increased from $8.4 trillion at the end of 2004 to $21 trillion at the end of 2013, marking 
a peak of $58 trillion at the end of 2007. Nowadays CDSs are considered a good proxy 
for credit risk, where the probability of default of the reference entity (and therefore the 
level of risk) is assumed by the counterparty.2 Furthermore CDSs are the most liquid 
credit derivative product and account for about half the amount of credit derivatives 
traded on the derivatives market. 
 
Due to its recognised hedging qualities, the expansion of emerging debt markets might 
have led to the recent increase of the fraction of the CDS contracts written on high-yield 
debt obligations. Emerging nations are amongst the largest high-yield borrowers in the 
world; however, when facing financial distress, countries generally do not enter 
traditional bankruptcy proceedings (hence don’t liquidate their assets), so the nature of 
default risk is somewhat different to that of a traditional debtor. In practice, countries go 
through debt restructuring mechanisms in which defaulted bond are exchanged for new 
longer maturity and lower yield debt instruments.  
 
Furthermore, recent literature has focused on the impact of sovereign credit ratings on 
sovereign debt, especially for emerging economies. Christopher et al. (2012) assert that 
sovereign ratings enhance the transparency of an emerging country’s credit risk profile, 
whereas Kim and Wu (2008) argue that rating changes within emerging economies have 
determinant information about the governments’ capacity to deal with both, their financial 
                                                          
1 A CDS is essentially an insurance contract that provides protection against the risk of default by a specific 
reference entity. The CDS spread is the periodic rate that a protection buyer pays on the notional amount 
to the protection seller for transferring the risk of a credit event for some period. 
2 There are several advantages of using CDS spreads instead of bond spreads. See for instance, Blanco et 
al. (2005), Norden and Weber (2009) and Jorion and Zhang (2009), amongst others.  
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obligations as well as their refinancing conditions, as rating changes provide information 
about the institutional quality for financial and economic development.   
 
Theoretically, both sovereign credit risk levels measured by CDS spreads and 
announcements of a credit rating changes should reflect the same information content, 
given that both are based on publicly available information.3 If this were to be true, we 
would not expect CDS spreads to react to a rating announcement. However, several recent 
papers (Finnerty et al., 2013, amongst others) find that the CDS market anticipates credit 
rating news. This literature has focused on analysing endogenic effects within a country 
or a firm, and hence little attention has been paid to cross-border effects. Following 
Wengner et al. (2015), we argue that the study of the response in the country that the 
rating event occurs is incomplete, because it does not reveal how much of the event’s 
information is country-specific and how much is market-wide. In fact literature has 
demonstrated that a significant part of sovereign CDS spreads is explained by common 
factors such as investors’ risk appetite and global economic fundamentals (Remolona et 
al., 2008, Longstaff et al., 2011, Eichengreen et al., 2012), so any credit rating 
announcement containing new information should have spillover effects on the CDS 
spreads of other sovereigns. Cross-border analyses allow us to investigate if non-event 
countries (seen as competitors) benefit or not from the rating event in a given country. In 
this paper we shall address this issue. 
 
We use the information contained in CDS contracts of Latin American emerging 
economies from 2004 to 2014 to investigate the cross-border spillover effects of the credit 
rating events. In particular, we test whether or not the contagion effect amongst sovereign 
CDSs has changed depending on rating announcements. The contagion is measured in 
terms of return spillovers following a Generalized VAR (GVAR) approach (Diebold and 
Yilmaz, 2012). More specifically, we calculate the change in the pairwise contagion 
before and after the credit rating event. Finally, we contrast whether they are statistically 
significant on average. We distinguish between positive and negative events, which 
enables us to analyse whether sovereign CDSs of non-event countries respond 
symmetrically to rating upgrades and downgrades in a given country. 
 
                                                          
3 Intuitively, one should expect a negative relationship between them, since the higher the CDS spread, the 
lower the credit rating. 
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To sum up, we seek to address the following questions: Is there a significant change in 
the spillover effect on CDS spreads of non-event sovereign entities due to credit rating 
announcements of a given country? Is there a significant change in the contagion before 
or after these events? Are the reactions symmetric in response to credit rate upgrades and 
downgrades?  
 
Our results are of economic relevance: portfolio managers and investors could estimate 
and evaluate the changes caused by the spillover effects of future credit rating 
announcements in one country on the non-event bordering economies. That way, they 
could use CDS market information in order to appropriately construct and hedge 
portfolios that are sensitive to sovereign credit risk contagion. Moreover, it allows us to 
identify the competitive effect produced by credit rating events in emerging cross-border 
non-event economies, which plays a pivotal role for discussions of future regulations. 
These findings have implications for international diversification and for a better 
understanding of the global/regional capital market structure.  
 
The remaining part of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the related 
literature, section 3 describes the data, section 4 discusses the methodological approach 
while section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review  
 
Previous research on the impact of rating changes has focused uniquely on the direct 
effect, that is, the impact on CDS markets within the same firm or country where the event 
occurs. Hull et al. (2004), Norden and Weber (2004), Galil and Soffer (2011) and Finnerty 
et al. (2013) amongst others, conclude that international sovereign and/or corporate CDS 
markets anticipate credit rating events, particularly for downgrades.4  
 
                                                          
4 Additionally, the literature has analyzed the effect of rating announcements on distinct markets: on bond 
markets (Hite and Warga, 1997, Steiner and Heinke, 2001), stock markets (Dichev and Pietroski, 2001, 
Behr and Güttler, 2008) or both (Hand et al., 1992). They all find evidence for analogous results: there is a 
market response to negative credit rating events, but no (or weak) significant reaction to positive ones. 
Hence, downgrades seems to be better anticipated than upgrades.  
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A growing strand of the literature looks at the cross-border spillover effect, measuring 
whether the effect of rating announcements also extends to bordering economies. Gande 
and Parsley (2005), Böninghausen and Zabel (2015), Ferreira and Gama (2007) and Baum 
et al. (2016) analyse the effect on international developed and emerging sovereign bond 
spreads (the first three papers) and stocks (latter one). They all find evidence for the 
existence of asymmetric spillovers, with a bigger impact of downgrades, concluding that 
geographic proximity and emerging market status amplify this effect. In the same line, 
Christopher et al. (2012) use data from stock and bond markets of nineteen emerging 
economies and conclude that co-movements within a region respond heterogeneously to 
sovereign ratings information. For the case of bonds in particular, they find a competitive 
effect for downgrades, since they lead to investors shifting funds from the downgraded 
market to the surrounding region and to a greater extent to countries with higher credit 
ratings.  
 
Finally, a few studies have included the CDS market in the analysis of the cross-border 
effect of credit rating events. Afonso et al. (2012) investigate the impact of sovereign 
credit ratings on European Union sovereign bond and CDS spreads, concluding that 
spillover effects are mostly unsignificant for sovereign CDSs, while they are quite 
significant for sovereign bonds. In this latter case, they find that the effect exists 
especially for Eurozone countries and from lower rated countries to higher rated 
countries. In contrast, Drago and Gallo (2016) find evidence of significant spillovers of 
downgrades on the Eurozone CDS market and they conclude that the spillovers’ size is 
due to economic and financial conditions of analysed countries. At the international 
corporate level, Wengner et al. (2015)’s findings indicate significant spillovers on non-
event firms. Concretely, downgrades (upgrades) display a competitive (imitation) effect 
around the event, with negative ones having a greater impact. Finally, using sovereign 
CDS data for twenty-two international emerging countries, Ismailescu and Kazemi 
(2010)’s results suggest that positive events are more likely to spill over to other emerging 
countries. This finding differs from the existing and previously mentioned literature 
related to sovereign debt markets. 
 
In this paper, we focus our attention on the analysis of spillover effects that a credit rating 
event occurring in one emerging country has on the CDS spreads of other bordering 
economies. The relationship between sovereign debt and credit ratings plays a pivotal 
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role, especially for emerging market investments, given the great expansion of these 
economies over recent years. We differ from the related papers in different ways. First, 
we do not only study the effect surrounding the event, but we also analyse the impact 
before and after the event occurs. Second, our paper also contributes to the related 
literature in that we focus exclusively on neighbour emerging countries within a particular 
area, since we argue that the cross-border spillover effect might be more pronounced 
amongst bordering countries than amongst countries belonging to distinct emerging areas. 
In particular, we focus on Latin American emerging markets and on an extensive sample 
period from 2004 to 2014. In addition, we provide not only a cross-sectional study for all 
available countries in Latin America, but we also look at the individual national level. 
The former will inform us as to whether or not an average spillover effect exists amongst 
all the countries, and the latter will allow us to identify which countries are the 
transmitters of the spillover effects on the non-event countries within the area. We argue 
that it seems more likely to find significant cross-border effects amongst countries within 
the same area, since they are more likely to be seen as competitors. Finally, we follow a 
distinct methodology since we test whether or not significant spillover effects exist in 
terms of changes in financial contagion amongst the six emerging economies. The idea is 
to see if the existing contagion between CDSs is significantly affected by credit rating 
announcements in a given country. The issue of contagion in financial markets is of 
fundamental importance (see Celik, 2012, amongst others) as it has serious consequences 
for the global economy in relation to monetary policy, optimal asset allocation, risk 
measurement, capital adequacy and asset pricing. To the best of our knowledge this has 
not been investigated up to now.  
 
Therefore, we contribute to the literature in that we bring together the literature on the 
impact of credit rating events on distinct financial markets and the literature on financial 
contagion in order to provide a better understanding of how contagion changes in 
bordering sovereign CDS markets resulting from credit rating announcements.  
 
Although it is quite an intuitive concept, contagion is difficult to define and measure 
empirically. Kaminsky et al. (2003), Bae et al. (2003) and Longstaff (2010), amongst 
others, define contagion as an episode in which there is a significant increase in cross-
market linkages when a shock occurs. According to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), 
contagion exists if there is a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock in 
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one country, whereas Bekaert et al. (2014) define contagion as the co-movement in excess 
of what can be explained by fundamentals taking into account their evolution over time. 
Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) review different definitions and related measures of contagion 
that are frequently used in the literature,5 concluding that all methodologies are drawn by 
limitations and caveats. In this study, we define contagion as the change in the 
propagation mechanism when a shock occurs and we measure it in terms of return 
spillovers using the GVAR methodology of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). This approach 
is particularly suited to our purposes, as it enables us to compute pairwise contagion 
change in a non-event bordering country resulting from a credit rating announcement. To 
our knowledge, this paper is the first to work with the novel GVAR method in order to 
document spillover effects in Latin American sovereign CDS markets caused by credit 
rating announcements. 
 
3. Data 
 
Our daily dataset consists of sovereign CDS spreads for Latin American emerging 
countries and was obtained from Datastream. We selected US dollar denominated, senior 
tier, 5-year CDS quotes, since these contracts are generally considered to be the most 
liquid ones and constitute the majority of the entire CDS market (Jorion and Zhang, 2007 
and Eichengreen et al., 2012). Covering almost a decade, we work with data from April 
22, 2004 to January 27, 2014 and look at six Latin American emerging markets; namely: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.6 Hence, our dataset results in 
15,288 daily panel observations for a time period of 2,548 days.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the CDS data for each country are reported in Table 1, while 
Figure 1 illustrates the daily time evolution of all the countries in our sample (Panel A) 
and the average CDS spreads through all of them (Panel B). The mean CDS spreads 
varied significantly by country ranging from 69.17 bps for Chile to 1,016.35 bps for 
Argentina. Two sharp increases in CDS premiums are observed during the sample period; 
the first corresponds to the 2008 global credit crisis, affecting all countries and Argentina 
                                                          
5 They include changes in the probability of currency crises, volatility spillovers, Markov-switching models, 
correlation or co-movements, and changes in the transmission mechanism.  
6 Following FTSE country classification as of September 2014, we cover all the types of emerging 
countries: advanced emerging (Brazil and Mexico), secondary emerging (Chile, Colombia and Peru) and 
frontier emerging (Argentina).  
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in particular, and the second sharp increase occurs at the end of the sample period and 
reflects the Argentinian credit risk troubles.   
 
Finally, we collect rating announcement events from S&P’s Sovereign Rating and 
Country Transfer and Convertibility Assessment Histories. Table 2 shows S&P’s rating 
categories, where we transform them into a discrete variable from 1 to 22. Literature has 
shown that S&P rating changes occur more frequently; hence, S&P provides us with a 
larger data set, which is less anticipated by market participants and precedes 
announcements of other rating agencies (Gande and Parsley, 2005, Reisen and Von 
Maltzan, 1999). In this study, rating events consist of changes in ratings and/or outlooks. 
Positive (negative) events are upgrades (downgrades) of S&P’s letter credit ratings or 
revisions in the sovereign country’s credit outlook.7  
 
Table 3 displays the distribution of credit rating events per country and per year. We 
observe 49 credit rating events for the six emerging markets in our sample, where rating 
upgrades clearly dominate with 40 observations in contrast to 9 downward observations. 
Chile, Colombia and Peru do not show negative events, while for Argentina, rating 
downgrades seem to be predominant. Twenty-one of the 40 positive events were reported 
in the first four years only, specifically until 2008. The global financial crisis of 2008 is 
accompanied by four downgrades reported in 2008 and 2009, affecting Argentina and 
Mexico. After the climax of the crisis, positive events dominate again with 16 credit rate 
upgrades against 4 downgrades, 3 of them affecting Argentina during 2012 and 2013, a 
period characterised by the decline of Argentinian credit quality.  
 
Figure 2 shows the credit rating evolution over time for each country. Overall, three main 
groups are observed. First, Chile stands out as the Latin American country with the 
highest quality credit (investment grade). Its S&P rating is around A on average over 
time, which means a strong payment capacity according to S&P. Next, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru are countries placed at the limit between investment grade and non-
investment grade categories, which means that overall these countries are likely to fulfil 
their obligations, but there is ongoing uncertainty. Finally, Argentina is the Latin 
                                                          
7 Credit Watches are not included because none of them occur during our sample period. 
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American country with the worst rating category over time. In fact, its S&P rating is 
around CCC, standing for a very high credit risk.   
 
4. Methodology 
The methodology follows a two-stage empirical procedure. In the first stage, we use 
sovereign CDS spreads, more precisely CDS log-returns, as an indicator of sovereign 
credit risk and measure the contagion effect amongst each pair of countries over time in 
a rolling framework. To do that we follow the GVAR methodology developed by Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) and consider the net pairwise return spillover indices,8 which 
measure the actual contagion between each pair of sovereign CDS return series and is 
given by equation (A.4). In particular, this index  𝑁𝑃𝑆௜→௝ீ  indicates that country i is a net 
transmitter (receiver) of sovereign CDS return spillovers to (from) country j. 
 
The second stage of the empirical procedure consists of measuring the impact of credit 
rate announcements for a given country on the cross-border contagion between sovereign 
CDSs. In particular, we calculate the change in the pairwise contagion before and after 
each credit rating event,9 known as the prior and post effect: 
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ൌ  𝑁𝑃𝑆௜→௝ீ ௧ െ  𝑁𝑃𝑆௜→௝ீ ௧ି௦,  for 𝑠 ൌ 1,2, … ,25 (1) 
 
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ൌ  𝑁𝑃𝑆௜→௝ீ ௧ା௦ െ  𝑁𝑃𝑆௜→௝ீ ௧,  for 𝑠 ൌ 1,2, … ,25 (2) 
 
where t is the day of the credit rating event, and 𝑠 denotes the number of days in the 
window before and after the event, where we test whether cross-border contagion 
amongst sovereign CDSs has significantly changed before and/or after a sovereign credit 
rating announcement in a given country.10 More concretely, we test if prior and post 
effects are significantly different from zero on average using a standard t-test. First, we 
take into account all the available countries and events in the sample, to see if cross-
                                                          
8 For a more in-depth explanation of the GVAR methodology and construction of contagion measures, see 
Appendix A.  
9 The rolling GVAR analysis leads to the loss of the first three credit rating events (all positive): the two 
reported in 2004 for Brazil and Peru, and the first one reported in 2005 for Mexico. Hence, we finally work 
with 46 credit rating announcements in total: 37 upwards and 9 downwards.  
10 The maximum value of 25 days is selected to avoid losing those events that are close to the beginning 
and the end of the sample period. 
10 
 
border contagion changes amongst CDSs due to sovereign credit rating events do exist 
when considering the six emerging markets all together. Second, we test the significance 
of prior and post effects of sovereign rating news for each country within the Latin 
American area. We argue that it seems more likely to find significant effects amongst the 
countries belonging to the same region, since they are more likely to be seen as 
competitors. Moreover, we distinguish between positive and negative events, which 
enables us to analyse whether sovereign CDSs of non-event countries respond 
symmetrically to rating upgrades and downgrades in a given country. 
 
If the prior (post) effect is revealed to be statistically significant for the window [t–s, t] 
([t, t+s]), we would find evidence for the existence of a significant change in the cross-
border contagion of sovereign credit risk s days before (after) the rating event. A 
significant and positive (negative) effect means an increase (decrease) of cross-border 
contagion of sovereign credit risk due to a rating event.  
 
The use of rating upgrades and downgrades separately allows us to identify whether 
countries within the same area are seen as direct competitors. If upgrades in a given 
country lead to a significant and positive (negative) change in cross-border contagion, it 
indicates that non-event countries benefit (suffer) from the rating event. The opposite is 
given for downgrades. If downgrades in a given country lead to a significant and positive 
(negative) change in cross-border contagion, it indicates that non-event countries suffer 
(benefit) from the rating event.     
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Table 4 displays the credit rating events’ prior and post significant effect on average 
through all the countries and all the events, while distinguishing between positive and 
negative events. We observe that the sovereign CDSs of the six Latin American countries 
under study experience a significant change in the cross-border contagion of sovereign 
credit risk due to a rating event. 
 
Regarding the prior-effect, we notice that they are always negative, indicating that cross-
border contagion decreases prior to the event. With regard to downgrades, the prior-effect 
is significant for all periods analysed, while the upgrades have a significant effect only in 
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the short-term (from 1 to 8 days prior to the event) and with a smaller impact in absolute 
value. These findings indicate that bordering non-event countries suffer (benefit) from 
upgrades (downgrades), which reflect a competition effect before the event occurs.  
 
The sign of significant post-effects is always positive, indicating that after the event cross-
border contagion increases significantly, and is basically due to positive credit rating 
announcements. This post-effect emerges three days after the event and it is more 
pronounced (in terms of magnitude) 20 days after the event. Finally, it is notable that 
upgrades benefit bordering non-event countries, indicating an imitation effect after the 
positive event occurs.    
 
In a next step, we study whether there is any particular country that leads the cross-border 
spillover effect to all others, with the purpose of isolating each transmitting countries. 
Table 5 displays the results. When the effects are significant, one observes that their 
estimated sign is consistent with the sign previously obtained on average across all 
countries. The significant prior (post) effects are always negative (positive) indicating a 
decrease (rise) in contagion, before (after) the event occurs.   
 
If we take a deeper look, the competition effect previously observed prior to the event for 
downgrades is transmitted by Argentina and Brazil. Both countries display significant 
values for all periods analysed, however, the impact is greater in the short term (from 3 
to 5 days) in the Argentinian case and in the long term (from 15 to 25 days) in the 
Brazilian case. On the other hand, the competition effect previously observed prior to the 
event for upgrades is due to Brazil and Mexico and to a greater extent to Chile, all of them 
in the short term. In addition to that, it is noticeable that Chile is the only transmitter (in 
the short term) of upgrades after the event occurs, with an imitation effect, meaning that 
after the rating events, only positive news in Chile have a significant impact on bordering 
countries in terms of an increase in contagion.   
 
To sum up, we find evidence that sovereign CDSs react to rating announcements 
concerning other sovereigns. The effect is asymmetric, with negative news having a 
quantitatively different impact than positive announcements; a finding in line with 
previous related literature on sovereign debt markets (Gande and Parsley, 2005, 
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Böninghausen and Zabel, 2015, Christopher et al., 2012, amongst others11). This result, 
although expected, is notable because only nine downgrades are observed in the sample. 
The Argentinian case is worthy of consideration, it has the worst credit qualification, 
linked to a very high credit risk according to S&P. In fact, the last new rating for 
Argentina was a rating change to CCC+ in September 2013, which finished with a CCC- 
rating level in August 2014. The case of Brazil is particularly remarkable. Its only outlook 
downgrade in June 2013 had a considerably significant impact in all periods and 
magnitudes. This rating event occurred in the last part of the sample. It was a negative 
revision of its credit quality BBB, leading to a BBB- in June 2014, being quite near the 
limit of the speculative grade status. Finally, these downgrade transmissions are just 
observed in the days before the rating announcement and the effect is one of competition. 
These findings indicate that non-event rival countries benefit from reduced refinancing 
capacity of the event country (due to its negative rating event) and they may be able to 
capture new borrowers from the displaced country within the area. In addition to that, the 
event countries correspond with the lower credit quality rating, indicating that the 
spillover goes from lower rated countries to higher rated ones, as pointed out by 
Christopher et al. (2012) and Afonso et al. (2012). In contrast, regarding upgrades, it 
stands out that amongst the high number of positive rating news observed in the sample, 
practically only the four occurring in Chile display a significant effect, both prior and post 
the event. Chile is the country with the greatest credit quality, having a strong payment 
capacity according to S&P (around A on average). The impact is one of competition 
before the positive event occurs in Chile, and of imitation after it. It indicates that positive 
rating news in Chile negatively affects bordering non-event countries before the event, 
but positively after it.  
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution over time of the net directional contagion from a given 
country to all other countries. It indicates if the isolated country is a transmitter or receiver 
of contagion when the measure is positive or negative, respectively.12 Overall, previous 
results are confirmed. Rating downgrades in Argentina go with a decrease in contagion 
before the event occurs. What are remarkable are the negative events of 2012. Although 
Argentina is shown to be a receiver of contagion from bordering countries over time, 
                                                          
11 Wengner et al. (2015) find the same result using corporate CDSs. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find the 
opposite result using sovereign CDSs of emerging countries. However, they use a distinct methodology and 
a very heterogeneous sample of international emerging economies.  
12 The particular expression for the net directional measure is given by equation (A.5) in Appendix A.  
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before 2012 the contagion decreases a lot and it starts to increase after 2012, before the 
rating downgrades occur. By contrast, two upgrades in Argentina stand out from the rest: 
March 2006 and April 2008. Their impact seems to be evident, since Argentina becomes 
to be a transmitter between these two dates.13 In the case of Brazil, we observe how both 
rating upgrades and downgrades go with a decrease in contagion before the event occurs. 
In particular, three upgrades stand out: February 2006, May 2007 and November 2011. 
On the other hand, the only downgrade (and outlook) in Brazil, in June 2013, has a 
significant impact. During June 2013 Brazil becomes a receiver of contagion, whereas its 
role is that of a transmitter during the rest of the sample period. In the case of Mexico, it 
is worth mentioning how contagion increases considerably prior to the upgrade of 
October 2007. In fact, the impact is so remarkable that Mexico goes from being a receiver 
to a transmitter of contagion during that period. Finally, Chile displays a decrease in 
contagion before the upgrades and a decrease after them. The most notable event is the 
credit rating change of December 2007.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper focuses on sovereign CDS markets, and investigates cross-border spillover 
effects, in terms of changes in contagion, due to credit rating announcements in six Latin 
American emerging economies during the wide sample period from 2004 to 2014. More 
specifically, we focus on measuring the effect in terms of impact on contagion that rating 
announcements in a particular country have on sovereign CDS spreads of other countries 
located in the same region. The contagion is measured using the novel GVAR approach 
of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). In particular, we first calculate the change in the pairwise 
contagion before and after each credit rating event using different windows of days. Next, 
we test whether or not they are significant on average, that is, whether or not contagion 
from the event country to bordering non-event countries has changed due to rating events. 
Additionally, we distinguish between positive and negative events in order to determine 
whether the reactions are symmetric in response to rating upgrades and downgrades.     
 
                                                          
13 This result seems to conflict with previous analysis, where upgrades in Argentina have not revealed to 
be statistically significant (Table 5). However, it should take into account that the test identifies significant 
effects on average through all the upgrades together, which does not mean that any of them could be 
individually significant. 
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Our results generally show evidence for the existence of a significant change in the cross-
border contagion of sovereign credit risk due to rating events in a given country. More 
specifically, the reactions are not symmetric in response to positive and negative 
announcements. Prior-effect results indicate that bordering non-event countries suffer 
(benefit) from upgrades (downgrades). It reflects a competition effect before the event 
occurs. Argentina and Brazil are the transmitters in the case of downgrades, indicating 
that the spillover goes from lower rated countries to higher rated ones. On the other hand, 
Brazil, Mexico and to a greater extent Chile, are the countries transmitting the competition 
effect observed before upgrades occur. Finally, regarding post-effects it is notable that 
upgrades benefit bordering non-event countries, indicating an imitation effect after 
positive events occur. As the only transmitter of this effect, Chile has a significant impact 
on the bordering countries in terms of an increase in contagion.   
 
This study might have quite useful applications: after the recent global financial crisis, 
regulatory authorities were focused on measuring and controlling credit risk contagion 
given its significant impact on financial stability. In this sense, the quantification of the 
impact in terms of contagion produced by credit rating events on bordering non-event 
emerging economies is crucial. It permits the identification of the competition effect 
produced by negative and positive rating events in cross-border emerging economies. 
This information is also useful for investors and portfolio managers in order to 
appropriately construct and hedge investment portfolios of emerging countries sensitive 
to sovereign credit risk. Additionally, given the importance and the increase of the CDS 
market, which is considered a reasonable proxy of credit risk, these results may also be 
helpful for future regulators when implementing new capital adequacy frameworks for 
individual countries and portfolios in the sovereign credit risk market. 
 
As an interesting further research, we propose to extend our paper in order to analyse the 
impact of sovereign credit rating events on bordering economies in terms of contagion, 
while distinguishing between systematic and idiosyncratic contagion. To do this, the idea 
is to follow the recent paper of Ballester et al. (2016) in order to see not only whether 
rating news imply a change in contagion in non-event countries, but also if the effect is 
linked to global emerging factors (systematic contagion) or linked to emerging specific 
factors (idiosyncratic contagion).  
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Appendix A 
 
The GVAR methodology developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) consists of a 
VAR-based spillover index particularly suited for the investigation of systems of highly 
interdependent variables. Spillovers are measured from a particular variance 
decomposition associated with an N-variable vector autoregression framework, which 
allows us to parse the forecast error variances of each variable into parts that are 
attributable to the various system shocks. The major advantage of this approach is that it 
eliminates the possible dependence of the results on ordering, in contrast to the traditional 
Cholesky factorisation.14 In addition to that, it includes directional contagion indicators 
from/to a particular series, focusing not only on total spillovers. 
 
First, a covariance stationary N-variable VAR(p) is estimated 
 
 𝑥௧ ൌ ∑ 𝜙௜௣௜ୀଵ 𝑥௧ି௜ ൅ 𝜀௧ (A.1)  
 
where ε~ሺ0, Σሻ is a vector of independently and identically distributed disturbances and 
𝑥௧ denotes a N-variable vector of CDS log-returns. To ease the analysis, the model is 
written as the moving average representation 𝑥௧ ൌ ∑ 𝐴௜𝜀௧ି௜ஶ௜ୀ଴ , where the 𝑁 ൈ 𝑁 
coefficient matrices are estimated by 𝐴௜ ൌ 𝜙ଵ𝐴௜ିଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶ𝐴௜ିଶ ൅ ⋯ ൅ 𝜙௣𝐴௜ି௣, with 𝐴଴ 
being the identity matrix and 𝐴௜ ൌ 0 for 𝑖 ൏ 0.  
 
Next, the variance decompositions are computed. The variance shares defined as the 
fractions of the H-step-ahead error variances in forecasting 𝑥௜ that are due to shocks to 
𝑥௝, for 𝐻 ൌ 1,2, …, are given by 
 
 𝜃௝→௜ீ ሺ𝐻ሻ ൌ ఙೕೕ
షభ ∑ ൫௘೔ᇲ஺೓௘ೕ൯మಹషభ೓సబ
∑ ൫௘೔ᇲ஺೓ஊ஺೓ᇲ ௘೔൯ಹషభ೓సబ
, for 𝑖, 𝑗 ൌ 1,2, … , 𝑁 (A.2) 
 
where 𝜎௝௝  is the standard deviation of the error term for the jth equation, i.e. the squared 
root of the diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix Σ and 𝑒௜ is the vector with 
                                                          
14 This problem is circumvented by exploiting the generalized VAR framework of Koop et al. (1996) and 
Pesaran and Shin (1998), amongst others. 
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1 as the ith element and 0 otherwise. As the shocks of each variable are not orthogonalised, 
the row sum of the variance decomposition is not equal to 1. Thus, each entry of the 
variance decomposition matrix can be normalised by the row sum as 
 
 𝜃෨௝→௜ீ ሺ𝐻ሻ ൌ ఏೕ→೔
ಸ ሺுሻ
∑ ఏೕ→೔ಸ ሺுሻೕಿసభ
ൈ 100, for 𝑖, 𝑗 ൌ 1,2, … , 𝑁 (A.3) 
 
where the multiplication by 100 is expressing the result in percentage terms. Note that, 
by construction ∑ 𝜃෨௝→௜ீ ሺ𝐻ሻே௝ୀଵ ൌ 100 and ∑ 𝜃෨௝→௜ீ ሺ𝐻ሻே௜,௝ୀଵ ൌ 𝑁 ൈ 100.  
 
Note also that return spillovers show the degree of variation in CDS log-returns of i, 
which is not due to the historical information of the CDS log-returns of i and j but to 
shocks (innovations) in CDS log-returns of j. This indicator takes higher values as the 
intensity of the contagion effect, caused by the specific shocks of j’s CDS log-returns, 
increases. In the extreme case in which there are no spillovers from one series to the other, 
the indicator is equal to zero.  
 
Using the above normalised variance contributions, we can then construct net pairwise 
return spillover indices using a 200-day rolling windows,15 which measure the actual 
contagion between each pair of return series, and are defined by  
 
 𝑁𝑃𝑆௜→௝ீ ൌ 𝜃෨௜→௝ீ ሺ𝐻ሻ െ 𝜃෨௝→௜ீ ሺ𝐻ሻ, for 𝑖, 𝑗 ൌ 1,2, … , 𝑁 (A.4) 
 
It is simply the difference between the gross return shocks transmitted from i to j and 
those transmitted from j to i. Hence, it is positive (negative) when the impact of i’s shocks 
is higher (lower) than vice versa, indicating that i is a net transmitter (receiver) of return 
spillovers to (from) j. 
 
Finally, the net directional return spillover indices measure the spillover transmitted by 
country i to all others.  
                                                          
15 At each rolling window, the lag p of the GVAR model is determined using the likelihood ratio test and 
the Akaike information criterion, which confirms that p varies over time. The forecast horizon H=10 is 
selected using the total return spillover index of the GVAR, which measures the contribution of spillovers 
of return shocks across all the series to the total forecast error variance (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012). This 
forecasting horizon is commonly used in similar studies (see for example Ballester et al., 2016). 
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 𝑁𝐷𝑆௜→௔௟௟ீ ሺ𝐻ሻ ൌ ∑ 𝜃෨௜→௝ீ ሺ𝐻ሻே௝ୀଵ
௜ஷ௝
െ ∑ 𝜃෨௝→௜ீ ሺ𝐻ሻ, for 𝑖 ൌ 1,2, … , 𝑁ே௝ୀଵ
௝ஷ௜
  (A.5)               
 
Is the difference between the gross return shocks transmitted by i to all other countries 
and those received by i from all other countries. Positive (negative) values of the 𝑁𝐷𝑆 
index indicate that country i is, in net terms, a transmitter (receiver) of return spillover 
effects. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the daily CDS spreads 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the daily 5-year sovereign CDS spreads expressed in basis 
points from April 22, 2004 to January 27, 2014 for six Latin American emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
  
  Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Argentina 1,016.35 1,024.02 1.50 4,961.65
Brazil 193.83 136.58 61.10 900.20
Chile 69.17 51.87 7.10 315.00
Colombia 184.49 105.86 64.70 613.30
Mexico 119.17 72.59 28.70 606.70
Peru 167.00 91.60 59.90 611.20
Average 291.67 197.15 70.63 1,116.82
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Table 2: S&P’s rating categories 
This table presents Standard & Poor’s rating categories and the transformation of them into a discrete 
variable from 1 to 22. 
 
Characterisation of debt and issuer S&P's rating 
Numerical 
transformation
Investment grade Highest quality AAA 22 
High quality AA+ 21 
AA 20 
AA- 19 
Strong payment capacity A+ 18 
A 17 
A- 16 
Adequate payment capacity BBB+ 15 
BBB 14 
BBB- 13 
Non-Investment grade Likely to fulfil obligations, ongoing uncertainty BB+ 12 
BB 11 
BB- 10 
High credit risk B+ 9 
B 8 
B- 7 
Very high credit risk CCC+ 6 
CCC 5 
CCC- 4 
CC 3 
Near default with possibility of recovery SD 2 
  Default D 1 
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Table 3: The distribution of credit rating events 
This table presents the distribution of credit rating events distinguishing between rating upgrades (U) and 
downgrades (D) per country and per year, from April 22, 2004 to January 27, 2014 for six Latin American 
emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Rating downgrades are displayed 
in bold, whereas revisions of ratings (outlooks) are shown in italics.    
 
  Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru 
Total  
U / D 
Total 
2004   17-Sep       4-Jun 2 / 0 2 
2005 1-Jun 8-Nov     11-Jan 11-Jul 6 / 0 6 
           1-Nov     
            3-Nov     
2006 23-Mar 28-Feb 14-Dec 22-Feb   20-Nov 7 / 1 8 
 2-Oct 22-Nov             
  3-Nov               
2007   16-May 18-Dec 5-Mar 2-Jul 23-Jul 6 / 0 6 
          8-Oct       
2008 25-Apr 30-Apr       14-Jul 3 / 2 5 
 11-Aug               
  31-Oct               
2009         11-May   0 / 2 2 
          14-Dec       
2010 13-Sep   16-Dec 7-Jul   23-Aug 4 / 0 4 
2011   23-May   16-Mar   30-Aug 5 / 0 5 
   25-Aug             
    17-Nov             
2012 23-Apr   26-Dec 15-Aug   29-Aug 3 / 2 5 
  5-Nov               
2013 10-Sep 6-Jun   24-Apr 12-Mar 19-Aug 4 / 2 6 
          19-Dec       
Total    
U / D  5 / 6 9 / 1  4 / 0 6 / 0 5 / 2 11 / 0 40 / 9 49 
Total 11 10 4 6 7 11 49 49 
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Table 4: The credit rating events’ prior and post effect across all countries  
This table presents the credit rating events’ prior and post effect on average across all the countries and all 
the events, distinguishing between rating upgrades (U) and downgrades (D). For any rating event in a given 
country occurring at time t, we test if prior and post effects are significantly different from zero on average 
for the windows [t–s,t] and [t,t+s] respectively, where s denotes the number of days in the window before 
and after the event. In particular, since the general conclusions hold, the table shows the results obtained 
for some selected values of s. *Significance at the 10% level; **Significance at the 5% level; ***Significance 
at the 1% level. The sample period ranges from April 22, 2004 to January 27, 2014. 
  
  
All 
countries 
Prior-effect Post-effect 
U D U D 
s = 1 -0.03* -0.20*** 0.03 0.02 
s = 2 -0.14** -0.35*** 0.13 0.08 
s = 3 -0.21*** -0.49*** 0.19** 0.18 
s = 4 -0.19*** -0.57*** 0.15 0.18 
s = 5 -0.17*** -0.74*** 0.27** 0.24** 
s = 8 -0.18*** -0.58*** 0.22** 0.28 
s = 10 -0.04 -0.59*** 0.14* 0.23 
s = 15 -0.02 -0.74*** 0.26** 0.30 
s = 20 -0.06 -0.77*** 0.57** 0.30 
s = 25 -0.05 -0.66*** 0.34** 0.28 
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Table 5: The credit rating events’ prior and post effect for the individual countries 
This table presents the credit rating events’ prior and post effect on average from each country to the rest of the non-event countries, distinguishing between rating upgrades (U) 
and downgrades (D). For any rating event in a given country occurring at time t, we test if prior and post effects are significantly different from zero on average for the windows 
[t–s,t] and [t,t+s] respectively, where s denotes the number of days in the window before and after the event. In particular, since the general conclusions hold, the table shows 
the results obtained for some selected values of s. *Significance at the 10% level; **Significance at the 5% level; ***Significance at the 1% level. The lack of statistics for 
downgrades in the case of Chile, Colombia and Peru is due to the lack of downgrades for these countries. The sample period ranges from April 22, 2004 to January 27, 2014.  
 
 Panel A: Argentina Panel B: Brazil Panel C: Chile 
 Prior-effect Post-effect Prior-effect Post-effect Prior-effect Post-effect 
 U D U D U D U D U D U D 
s = 1 0.00 -0.18*** -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.43*** -0.02 -0.06 -0.10* – 0.06 – 
s = 2 0.01 -0.26*** 0.58* 0.00 -0.04 -0.78** 0.06 0.18 -0.82** – 0.29** – 
s = 3 -0.01 -0.67*** 0.65* 0.00 -0.04 -0.77** 0.17 0.45* -0.88** – 0.42*** – 
s = 4 -0.01 -0.67*** 0.39 0.00 -0.18* -1.02** 0.19 0.46 -0.81** – 0.32** – 
s = 5 0.06 -1.32*** 0.43 0.08 -0.21** -0.90** 0.20 0.57* -0.76** – 0.95** – 
s = 8 -0.10 -0.76*** 0.48 0.02 -0.19* -0.96** 0.16 0.74* -0.62* – 0.23* – 
s = 10 -0.03 -0.81*** 0.16 -0.03 -0.08 -0.99** 0.25* 0.63 -0.55* – 0.15 – 
s = 15 0.13 -1.18*** 0.54 -0.06 -0.17 -1.19** 0.24* 0.88* -0.47 – 0.69 – 
s = 20 0.05 -0.86*** 0.35 -0.04 -0.25 -1.45** 0.08 1.07* -0.40 – 0.79* – 
s = 25 0.04 -0.69*** 0.39 -0.22 -0.22 -1.27*** 0.23 1.21* -0.26 – 0.17 – 
 Panel D: Colombia Panel E: Mexico Panel F: Peru 
 Prior-effect Post-effect Prior-effect Post-effect Prior-effect Post-effect 
 U D U D U D U D U D U D 
s = 1 0.04 – -0.21 – 0.03 0.02* 0.00 0.04 -0.12 – 0.02 – 
s = 2 0.04 – -0.20 – 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.07* -0.11 – 0.02 – 
s = 3 -0.05 – -0.27 – -0.12*** -0.04** 0.08 0.09** -0.15** – 0.10 – 
s = 4 -0.01 – -0.28 – 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 0.08* -0.13 – 0.39 – 
s = 5 0.06 – -0.25 – -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.08* -0.14* – 0.36 – 
s = 8 -0.07 – 0.08 – 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.08 -0.15* – 0.28 – 
s = 10 0.27 – 0.11 – 0.09 0.04 -0.11 0.09 0.07 – 0.26 – 
s = 15 0.15 – 0.14 – 0.23 0.14 -0.20 0.09 0.04 – 0.16 – 
s = 20 0.20 – -0.04 – 0.12 -0.01 2.00* -0.15 -0.10 – 0.22 – 
s = 25 0.28 – 0.08 – 0.20 -0.03 0.93 -0.16 -0.31 – 0.24 – 
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Figure 1: Daily time evolution of CDS spreads 
The figures represent the daily time evolution of the six emerging countries’ CDS spreads (Panel A), and 
the daily time evolution of the emerging market average CDS spreads (Panel B), calculated as the average 
CDS spreads of all the six emerging countries. The sample period ranges from April 22, 2004 to January 
27, 2014 and the countries are the following ones: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
The scale in Argentina ranges from 0 to 5,000; for all other countries the scale ranges from 0 to 1,000 and 
the average CDS spread (Panel B) ranges from 0 to 1,200. 
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Figure 1: Daily time evolution of CDS spreads (cont.) 
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Figure 2: Daily time evolution of S&P’s Credit Rating  
This figure represents the daily time evolution of S&P’s credit rating for the six emerging countries. A 
rating change (outlook) of category is displayed as an increase (if upgrade) or decrease (if downgrade) of 
1 (0.5). The sample period ranges from April 22, 2004 to January 27, 2014.  
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Figure 3: Net-Directional Contagion from a given country to all others 
This figure reports the time evolution of the net directional return spillover index for contagion (in 
percentage) transmitted from a given country to all others. Positive (negative) values indicate that the 
corresponding country is, in net terms, a transmitter (receiver) of contagion to all others. Rating upgrades 
(downgrades) are displayed in blue (red). The sample period ranges from April 22, 2004 to January 27, 
2014, but the index starts on January 27, 2005 since a 200-day rolling window is used to get the evolution 
over time. 
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